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In the analysis of the risk associated to rare events that may lead to catastrophic consequences 
with large uncertainty, it is questionable that the knowledge and information available for the 
analysis can be reflected properly by probabilities. Approaches other than purely probabilistic 
have been suggested, for example using interval probabilities, possibilistic measures, or 
qualitative methods. In the present paper, we look into the problem and identify a number of 
issues which are foundational for its treatment. The foundational issues addressed reflect on the 
position that “probability is perfect” and take into open consideration the need for an extended 
framework for risk assessment that reflects the separation that practically exists between analyst 
and decision maker.  
 








Probabilistic analysis has now been used for more than 30 years (ref. the Reactor Safety Study, 
WASH-1400 [1]) as the basis for the analytical and quantitative process of risk assessment; see 
the reviews by Rechard [2,3]. A probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), sometimes also referred to 
as a quantitative risk assessment (QRA), systemises the knowledge, information and uncertainties 
about the phenomena involved in the activities studied: what are the possible hazards and threats, 
their causes and consequences? What are the probabilities of occurrence of the accident scenarios 
leading to these consequences? Knowledge is input into the QRA model and the associated 
uncertainties are expressed with probabilistic metrics; then, also the risk metrics in output are 
represented in terms of probabilistic metrics, to display the uncertainties; see e.g. the review by 
Jonkman et al. [4].  
 
In a practical QRA setting it is common to distinguish between aleatory (stochastic) and 
epistemic (knowledge-related) uncertainty [5,6,7]. The former refers to variation in large 
populations, is typically measured using frequentist probabilities and is considered irreducible; 
the latter refers to lack of knowledge about phenomena (usually translating into uncertainty about 
the parameters of a model used to describe some phenomenon or phenomena), is typically 
measured using subjective probability and is considered reducible. Winkler [8] describes the 
distinction between types of uncertainty – aleatory and epistemic uncertainty in particular – as 
fundamentally flawed but, nevertheless (and in line with Apostolakis [9]), as useful for the 




‘There is only one kind of uncertainty stemming from our lack of knowledge concerning the truth of a 
proposition […] [Distinctions between probabilities are] merely for our convenience in investigating 
complex phenomena. Probability is always a measure of degree of belief.’ 
 
As for the objective/subjective distinction that is often tacitly taken to underlie the 
frequentist/subjective probability distinction, Winkler writes [8 p. 128]: 
 
‘To some individuals, especially those trained in a scientific environment, the subjectivity in subjective 
probability seems to be at odds with a scientific search for objectivity. But, in fact, objectivity in dealing 
with uncertainty in the real world is a goal that is elusive at best and might more realistically be viewed as 
unattainable. In order to apply the classical or relative-frequency interpretations of probability, certain 
assumptions must be made, and these are ultimately subjective assumptions (Gelman et al.3).’ 
 
As for measurement, Popper distinguishes three worlds (see e.g. [10]): the physical world, the 
personal and subjective world, and the objective world of others; in addition, at the intersection of 
the second and third worlds, is the shared inter-subjective world. Measurement of properties of 
the physical world, such as the length of an object, is different from measurement of uncertainty 
in the sense of lack of knowledge, expressed by subjective probability reflecting a person’s 
degree of belief. Some (e.g. [10,11]) would refer to this as measurement of hard and soft systems, 
respectively. 
 
Probabilistic analysis is the predominant method used to handle the uncertainties involved in risk 
analysis, both of aleatory and epistemic types. It is also used in the quantification of margins and 
uncertainties in analyses that use computational models to predict complex system behaviour 
[12]. It seems correct to say that probability is indeed perfectly suited to describe aleatory 
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uncertainty, in its limiting relative frequency interpretation. When used as representation of 
epistemic uncertainty, the suitable interpretation is the subjective one typical of the Bayesian 
probabilistic framework [13,14].  By subjective probability is here meant the exact assignment, 
say, P(A) = 0.3, thus “à la Savage” [15]. Of course, if we judge the event A to be part of an 
exchangeable sequence we would introduce a chance/propensity p of A, understood as the 
limiting relative frequency of A in an infinite exchangeable sequence; then proceed to assign 
P(A|p) = p and establish a (prior) probability distribution F(p’) = P(p ≤ p’) on p. Here P(A) and 
F(p’) are subjective probabilities expressing degrees of beliefs, and both P(A), determined as the 
integral of P(A|p) with respect to F, as well as the value of F(p’) for a given p’, are fixed, which is 
the point we are making above. 
 
However, many researchers have to greater or lesser extent criticised probability as a 
representation of epistemic uncertainty. A number of alternative representations of epistemic 
uncertainty have been proposed, including imprecise/interval probability [16,17,18,19,20], 
probability bounds (p-box) analysis [21,22], fuzzy set theory [23,24], fuzzy probability [25], the 
theory of possibility [26,27,28] and the theory of belief functions (evidence theory/Dempster-
Shafer theory) [29]. Some amend the aleatory and epistemic uncertainty concepts by concepts 
such as fuzziness, ambiguity and vagueness, to be handled using fuzzy set theory; see e.g. 
[30,31]. Other (e.g. [13]) argue against this, saying for example that uncertainty must be 
distinguished from ambiguity, which must be removed before it is meaningful to discuss 
uncertainty (removed here means reduced to a desirable or practicable level, which is assumed to 
always be possible). In the present paper, we do not look into fuzzy set theory and related 
representations, as their motivation is not to describe epistemic uncertainty about unknown true 
quantities but to provide uncertainty statements about vague or ambiguous statements such as 
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“few leakages”. Formally this means that we restrict attention to classical (binary) set theory. See 
also the special issues of JRR [32], JSTP [33] and RESS [34] on the subject of alternative 
representations of uncertainty. One way to categorise alternative representations is [35,36]:  
 
a) Probability-bound analysis, combining probability analysis and interval analysis [37]. 
Interval analysis is used for those components whose aleatory uncertainties cannot be 
accurately estimated; for the other components, traditional probabilistic analysis is carried 
out. 
b) Imprecise probability, after Walley [19] and the robust statistics area [38] (see also 
[39,40]), which encompasses probability-bound analysis, and certain aspects of evidence 
and possibility theory as special cases. 
c) Evidence theory (or belief function theory) as proposed by Dempster [41] and Shafer 
[29], and the closely linked theory of random sets [42].  
d) Possibility theory [26,27,43], which is formally a special case of the imprecise probability 
and random set theories (see Destercke et al. [53] for some theoretical links between 
random sets, possibility functions, probability intervals, as well as so-called p-boxes and 
clouds). 
 
For a unified overview of various representations of uncertainty that have arisen in the areas of 
artificial intelligence and decision theory during the last fifty years, reference is made to  [43]. 
 
The above mentioned methods produce epistemic-based uncertainty descriptions and in particular 
intervals. They have not been broadly accepted in the risk assessment community. Although 
much effort has been made in the area of alternative uncertainty representations there are still 
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many open questions related to the foundations of these approaches and their use in both 
inference as well as risk and uncertainty decision-making; see for example the discussions in [44, 
45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51]. Many risk researchers and risk analysts are skeptical towards the use 
of the alternative approaches (such as those of the four categories a) – d) mentioned above) for 
the representation and treatment of uncertainty in risk assessment for decision-making, and some 
also argue intensively against them; see, for example [50 p. 280]. According to Cooke [52] 
alternative representations have been on the decline for at least the last 20 or so years in the 
artificial intelligence community, having been introduced in relation to expert systems in the 
1970’s leading to ‘an explosion of “alternative representations of uncertainty” through the 
1980’s’ [52 p. 14]. So although re-emerging in new fields, as Cooke [52] also points out, the field 
where it was introduced apparently to an increasing and lately dominant extent prefers the 
Bayesian framework over alternative representation. One main objection raised, as we will come 
back to in Section 4, is lack of operational meanings, or interpretations, for these representations. 
 
Most developments relating to the non-probabilistic and hybrid representations of uncertainty 
address technical issues, whereas less is said on foundational issues and little can be found on 
principles and guidelines for selection and use in the practice of risk assessment. In the present 
paper, we attempt to address that side of the problem and identify directions and needs for 
development. We discuss the needs for probability and the challenges in the use of non-
probabilistic representations of uncertainties. We address the practical issues coming from the 
fact that the risk assessment is conducted by an analyst and the results are used by one or more 
decision-makers, and the complications which arise from subjectivity and separation. Axiomatic 
differences between uncertainty representations is hence outside the scope of the present paper; 
we refer to [53] for a discussion on this topic. Furthermore, a critical review and discussion of 
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evidence theory and possibility theory in the context of system analysis is offered in [54], 
focusing on inter alia formal properties and combination of knowledge. 
 
The paper tries to get right to the point as follows: in Sections 2 through 6 we recall the 
differences in the alternative representations of uncertainties, and present and discuss the issues; 
in Section 3 we provide an overall discussion and in Section 8 we draw some conclusions and 
provide some ideas of directions for development. 
 
 
2. SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY 
 
In the Bayesian probabilistic framework of representation of epistemic uncertainty, probability is 
interpreted as a subjective measure of uncertainty – an expression of degree of belief of the 
analyst, then governed by the axioms of probability. The term subjective probability is most 
commonly used, but we see also other words adopted such as judgmental probability and 
knowledge-based probability. By subjective probability here is meant an exact assignment, say 
P(A) = 0.3. Two interpretations are described below, one making reference to betting and the 
other to a standard for measurement of uncertainty. 
 
If linked to betting, the probability of an event A, P(A), equals the amount of money that the 
analyst(s) assigning the probability would be willing to bet if a single unit of payment would be 
given in return in the case that the event A were to occur, and nothing otherwise. The opposite 
bet must also hold, i.e. the assessor must be willing to bet the amount 1 – P(A) if a single unit of 
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payment would be given in return in the case that A were not to occur, and nothing otherwise 
[56]. 
 
If linked to the standard for measurement of uncertainty, the probability P(A) is the number such 
that the uncertainty about the occurrence of event A is considered equivalent to the uncertainty 
about the occurrence of some standard event, e.g. drawing a red ball at random from an urn that 
contains P(A) x 100 % red balls and 1-P(A) x 100 % balls of colors other than red (e.g. 
[57,58,59,60]).  
 
Several authors argue that the problem of using probability in application lies with the 
measurement procedures and not with the probability concept in itself (e.g. [59,60]).  One 
development direction then, as suggested by Lindley [59] and O'Hagan & Oakley [61], is to 
retain probability as the sole representation of uncertainty and to focus on improving the 
measurement procedures for probability. The thesis is that no alternative to probability is needed, 
as “probability is perfect” [58,61,62]. These authors acknowledge that there is a problem of 
imprecision in probability assignments, but that is considered a problem related to the elicitation 
of probabilities, and not a problem of the probability concept.   
 
This is a strong thesis that in our view is not justifiable as a general statement. We need to clarify 
the situations addressed, making some distinctions important for the practice of risk assessment 
and management. The classical case of decision analysis for risk management considers the 
situation in which the assessor of the probabilities and risk is also the decision maker: in this 
case, it is possible to argue that the use of (subjective) probability as the only uncertainty measure 
is proper, because the subjectivity of the assessment is brought in the decision scheme coherently 
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by the assessor herself/himself. In simple words, the assessor expresses her/his judgements to 
arrive at the assessment of the probabilities which she/he uses for the decision making. However, 
the situation most commonly encountered in practice is different, wherein there is one (or more) 
assessor(s) who perform the (probabilistic) risk assessment whose results are fed to decision 
makers other than the assessor(s). What characterise such situations is specifically: 
 
1. A risk assessment is carried out by a risk analyst/expert group following a request from 
the decision maker(s) (or another stakeholder(s)). The assessment is dependent on the 
subjective expertise of the assessor(s). 
2. The aim is to carry out the assessment, whose results are independent of the decision 
maker (and other stakeholders). 
3. Several stakeholders other than the decision maker will often be informed by the 
assessment and its results.   
4. The decision maker(s) and stakeholders will perform the decision making process 
according to their subjective values and preferences, and be informed by the risk results 
performed by the assessor(s) on the basis of her/his (subjective) expertise. 
 
An example is a societal safety issue, where politicians are to make decisions on protection 
measures, informed by the results of a risk assessment characterising the risks associated to 
alternative options, where the risk assessment is performed by expert risk analysts.  
 
The issue of separation between analyst and decision-maker is of course a transversal one and 





It is clear that in these situations, the decisions taken by the decision makers are influenced also 
by the knowledge that the assessors put in the risk assessment, through the output probabilities 
calculated. The depth of the knowledge about the system and phenomena studied determines the 
strength of the assessment, and of its influence on the decision maker. On the contrary, when 
knowledge is poor, this should be transparent and acknowledged in the decision process which 
relies on the provided probabilities.  
 
In the above scenario of decision making, we advocate strongly that the output that should be 
retained from the risk assessment and accounted for in the decision making process comprises 
two main components:  
 
a) The quantitative description given by the uncertainty measure used Q (for example, 
probability P). 
b) The background knowledge K used in the assessment.     
 
We regard this as fundamentally important, because the probabilities of the risk assessment are 
by definition subjective, or inter-subjective to some extent, depending on the situation analysed. 
The point we are trying to convey is that the subjective probability P(A) can be written as P(A|K), 
where K denotes the background knowledge that the probability is based on. We can have 
P(A|K1) = P(A|K2) for vastly different background knowledge bases K1 and K2, e.g. one (say K1) 
includes reliable models, abundant relevant data, strong agreement among experts and, in 
particular, weak assumptions because of the strong knowledge on the system and the related 
events and phenomena, whereas the other (K2) includes less reliable models, little or no relevant 
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data, disagreement among experts and strong assumptions because of the weak knowledge on the 
system and the related events and phenomena. When performing a risk assessment, the 
background knowledge is to large extent expressed in the assumptions made. In case of relatively 
poor knowledge, stronger assumptions are made. With strong knowledge, lighter assumptions are 
required. Table I presents a matrix of different situations reflecting different “states” of Q and K.  
 
Table I:  A matrix reflecting different situations of uncertainty descriptions Q and knowledge K (the numbers are just 
references for these elements of the matrix). 
Uncertainty measure Q 
Knowledge K 
Subjective  Inter-subjectivity 




Weak assumptions made 




Medium:   
Moderately strong 
assumptions made in the 
risk assessments   
 (2)  (4) 
Poor:   
Strong assumptions 
made in the risk 
assessments  
 




Consider the case (1), which is characterised by strong assumptions and a subjective measure of 
uncertainty, understood as a subjective probability. By replacing the probability Q by an interval 
probability, the intention is to move the situation to (2), (3), (4) or (5). The idea is to use intervals 
that are less subjective and based on not so strong assumptions. In most cases the change would 
lead to the situation (2), as the intervals would need also to be based on some assumptions and 
there are always aspects of the uncertainty description that are not generally inter-subjective. 
 
Arguably it may be no easier to obtain agreement on a lower and upper probability than on an 
exact probability. However, in some cases it could be possible to find intervals that experts could 
agree on. Suppose that we have agreement on the conditional probability P(A|X), but 
disagreement on the probability distribution of X, where X is known to take a value in the 
interval [xmin, xmax]. Then we may at least obtain agreement on the probability interval [P(A|xmin), 
P(A|xmax)] (assuming that P(A|x) is increasing in x), although of course this could lead to a very 
wide interval. 
 
We stress that we perform no value ranking of the different elements of the matrix in Table 1.   A 
subjective assignment (1) may well serve the purpose of the assessment in some cases, where 
focus is on reporting some analysts’ view on specific issues. The results are acknowledged as 
subjective but still considered informative for the relevant decision making. In other cases, we 
may look for more inter-subjective results, more independent of the judgements of specific 
analysts or experts. Normally we find that a combination of different approaches can be useful to 
support the decision making. We need to produce both subjective judgments and beliefs by 
selected analysts and experts, and we need to produce more inter-subjective results where the 
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knowledge and lack of knowledge available are laid out ‘plain and flat’ with no additional 
information inserted.  
 
 
3. LOWER AND UPPER PROBABILITIES 
 
Interval or imprecise probabilities are proposed as an uncertainty measure, alternative to 
“precise” (single-valued) subjective probabilities. The motivation is that intervals in many cases 
correspond better to the (weak) information available. The intervals can be elicited by direct 
arguments or constructed indirectly from assigned possibility functions or mass functions, in the 
framework of evidence theory.  
 
Consider the problem of (subjectively) describing the uncertainty of a quantity x which is known 
to take value 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5. The basis for the assignment of the probabilities of the different 
values is rather weak, because of little knowledge on the process generating x, i.e. because of 
large epistemic uncertainties. Using precise probabilities, the analyst is required to specify five 
values, i.e. one probability for each one of the possible values of x, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 (so, actually, 
only four probabilities are needed as their sum must be 1). Based on the scarce knowledge of the 
process, the analyst might find it difficult to assign a specific, precise probability mass to each of 
the 5 possible values of x: a distribution like for example 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.1, 0.3 may leave the 
analyst with the uneasy feeling that the numbers are somewhat arbitrary given the rather weak 
background for the assignments. Yet the assessor may find it practically feasible as she/he has 
just four numbers to assign and feels that the values assigned indeed are reflecting her/his best 
judgment. Alternatively, she/he could opt for a uniform distribution to reflect that she/he has the 
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same degree of belief in x to be equal to, say, 2 as in x to be equal to, say, 5 or any other value. 
On the premise that such a distribution does, in fact, reflect the assessor’s uncertainties, it is 
attractive to use it as only one value is needed.  
 
In principle, the assignment of intervals would seem more fit to a situation of scarce knowledge 
of the process, which leads to a lack of precision in the value assignment of probabilities. This is 
because the analyst need not specify one exact number; on the contrary, she/he is given a way to 
reflect her/his limited knowledge, and her/his associated uncertainty in the assignments, through 
an imprecise (interval) specification. However, the matter of fact is that in practice the analyst is 
still required to assign numbers, and now not just one for each x but two, a lower and an upper 
bound reflecting the imprecision of the assignment in view of the scarce knowledge.  Take for 
example x=3. The question to address is: How likely is it that x=3? The analyst finds it difficult 
to specify just one number in [0,1]; but how, then, does she/he assign the bounds? One way is 
direct assignment, e.g. say, that the probability of x=3 lies in the interval [0.2, 0.5]; but, again, 
one may feel that the assignment of such an interval is somewhat arbitrary and now, actually, we 
have a double assignment (lower and upper bounds of the intervals), with double source of 
arbitrariness. Also, it is challenging to really interpret what the assigned interval expresses. First 
of all, it expresses that the analyst is not willing to specify her/his degree of belief on the 
probability of x=3 more precisely than [0.2, 0.5].  It also states that the analyst’s degree of belief 
on the realization of the value x=3 is higher than that she/he has when drawing a specific ball out 
of an urn having 5 balls, but lower than when drawing a ball from an urn having 2 balls. She/he is 
not willing to specify her/his beliefs on the value of x further than this. This reasoning is not 
straightforward and it might be difficult to “absorb” by the assessors who are asked to provide the 
16 
 
assignments. It is our experience that the assessors need a lot of training and practice to get used 
to this way of thinking. 
 
In addition, many assessors struggle with understanding what is gained by the use of interval 
probability assignments compared to exact numbers. In the end, the richer description provided 
by the intervals, which are capable of representing the imprecision in the assignments, is 
contained in a double set of numbers, whose message is far more difficult to read than single 
point values. With the difficulties that they encounter in assigning the numbers, they question the 
need for going beyond one uncertainty description level, as provided by single-valued 
probabilities.   
 
This reflection is important for the practice of risk assessment and the consequential decision 
making. To be able to effectively use interval probabilities in practice, the obstacles in the 
interval assignments need to be identified, addressed and adequately dealt with. More, and 
extensive, research needs to be carried out in the directions of interval elicitations and interval 
interpretations. Until solid solutions are offered, pragmatically, our recommendations for cases in 
which the background knowledge is poor and not given in a clear structured form, are:  
 
 still use exact probabilities, but supplemented with an explicit characterization of the 
background knowledge, e.g. by a qualitative  approach for assessing the importance of the 
assumptions that the quantitative analysis is based on (see Section 6).  
 use interval probabilities to supplement the exact probabilities if the format of the 
information and knowledge available justifies the assignment of a specific interval of 
values, for example if a specific possibility function can be derived, or the expert 
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judgments are elicited in a form that supports the use of intervals. For instance, suppose 
that the experts provide information about x of the form: there is nothing to suggest that 
the value of x is or is not 3; for the remaining x values 1, 2, 4 and 5, my upper 
probabilities are 0.2, 0.5, 0.3 and 0.7. These elicited expert judgments could be well 
reflected by the set of probability intervals [0, 0.2], [0, 0.5], [0, 1], [0, 0.3] and [0, 0.7]. 
 
 
4. “POSSIBILITY”, “BELIEF”, AND OTHER NON-PROBABILISTIC MEASURES OF 
UNCERTAINTY 
 
Both probability-bound and imprecise probability analyses can be seen as extensions of 
probability analysis. Their common, starting ground is that single-valued probability is not 
considered adequate for representing uncertainty and the solution called for is a representation of 
uncertainty based on measures interpreted as lower and upper probabilities. Also the 
representations based on evidence theory (belief and plausibility measures) and possibility theory 
(necessity and possibility measures) can be interpreted as lower and upper probabilities; in fact, 
technically both possibility theory and probability theory are special cases of evidence theory. 
However, belief measures and possibility measures can also be understood as expressing 
“degrees of belief” and “degrees of possibility” per se, and not as lower and upper probabilities. 
This is how belief functions are to be understood according to Shafer [29], who presents evidence 
theory as a generalisation of the Bayesian theory of subjective probability in the sense that it does 
not require probabilities for each proposition or event of interest but bases the belief in the truth 
of a proposition or occurrence of an event on the probabilities of other propositions or events 
related to it. Shafer [63] uses several metaphors for assigning (and hence interpreting) a belief 
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function Bel. The simplest says that Bel(A) = q means that the assessor judges the strength of the 
evidence indicating that event A is true, is comparable with that of the evidence provided by a 
witness who has a q x 100 % chance of being reliable, i.e.  
 
Bel(A) = P(the witness claiming that A is true, is reliable). 
 
Hence, it is clear that a duality in terms of interpretation, analogous to that which affects 
probability (limiting relative frequency vs degree of belief), also affects possibility theory (degree 
of necessity/possibility vs lower/upper probabilities) and the theory of belief functions (degree of 
belief/plausibility vs lower/upper probabilities). Developing methods based on interpretations 
other than with reference to lower/upper probabilities represents a distinct development direction 
for uncertainty representation in risk analysis. Phrases such as 'degree of possibility' in possibility 
theory and 'degree of belief’ in evidence theory do not provide sufficiently clear interpretations. 
This is the motivation for Cooke [64] asking for an 'operational definition' of the possibility 
function in possibility theory (and the membership function in fuzzy set theory). One key 
challenge is hence to develop or apply a clear interpretation (operational definition) of these 
concepts, and then to develop appropriate measurement/elicitation procedures. 
 
 
5. HYBRID REPRESENTATIONS OF UNCERTAINTY 
 
Probability-bound analysis (item a) in the first list in Section 1) is an example of how research 
has also been directed towards the combination of different representations, in this case 
probabilistic analysis and interval analysis. Another example is probabilistic analysis and 
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possibility theory, where the uncertainties related to some of the parameters of a model are 
represented by probability distributions and the uncertainties related to the remaining parameters 
are represented by possibility distributions; see e.g. [65] and the applications in [66,67,68]. 
Probability and possibility distributions are special cases of belief functions and integrative work 
has also been carried out in the framework of belief functions theory; see e.g. [69,70,71]. A 
hybrid method has also been developed to combine nonparametric predictive inference (NPI) and 
the standard Bayesian framework; see [72]. 
 
The combination of uncertainty representations implies that different representations apply to 
different situations. Unfortunately, authoritative guidance is hard to find on when to use 
probability and when to use alternative representations in the context of risk assessment. The 
argument often seems to be that probability is the appropriate representation of uncertainty only 
when a sufficient amount of data exists on which to base the assignment of the probability 
(distribution) in question; however, it is not obvious how to make such a prescription operational 
[73 p. 33]: Consider the representation of uncertainty about the parameter(s) of a frequency 
probability model. If a sufficiently large amount of data exists, there would be no uncertainty 
about the parameter(s) and hence no need for a representation of such uncertainty. When is there 
enough data to justify probability, but not enough to accurately specify the true value of the 
parameter in question and thus make single-valued probability as an epistemic concept 
superfluous? 
 
As an example [73 p. 33], consider the representation of uncertainty about the parameter p of a 
Bernoulli random quantity X1 for which no observations are available and for which it is 
considered difficult to have any well-founded opinions. A typical ignorance prior for p would be 
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a beta probability distribution with parameters x0 and n0 both equal to 1, which yields a uniform 
probability distribution on the unit interval and P(X1 = 1) = E[p] = x0/(x0 + n0) = 0.5. The core of 
an often-made argument is then that, say, for the throw of an untested but unsuspected coin, most 
people would also assign P(Y = 1) = E[q] = 0.5 (resulting from a non-uniform probability 
distribution on q, centred around 0.5), where Y equals 1 if the outcome is 'heads' and 0 if 'tails', 
but perhaps have a (qualitatively) vastly different comprehension of the situation. One possible 
resolution of this problem is to assign say P(X1 = 1) = 1/2 and P(Y = 1) = 100/200, the 
denominator and numerator chosen to reflect the confidence in the probability assignment 
(Lindley, 1985); however, this involves the assignment of two numbers, just as for the 
assignment of lower and upper probabilities. Suppose that we observe realizations of the 
Bernoulli process and through Bayesian updating obtain pn = P(Xn+1 = 1|x0, x1, …, xn) = (x0 + x1 
+ … + xn) / (x0 + n0 + n). As n tends to infinity, we have, by the law of large numbers, that pn 
tends to the true value of p. The questions then are:  
 For which values of n is a probabilistic representation justified and for which values not?  
 And when a probabilistic representation is not justified, what should be the criteria for 
selecting a particular representation format (interval analysis, imprecise probability, 
possibility theory, evidence theory, etc.)? 
 
For the first question a pragmatic approach is probably required. Precise probability is an ideal 
case where no imprecision is involved; however, there will always be some degree of 
imprecision. On the other hand, because of the relative simplicity of using (calculating with) 
probabilities, it is desirable to use probability if the level of imprecision involved is considered 
negligible. Also, depending on the relevance of the available observations, different values of n 




The second question points at an important direction of research in relation to the development of 
the hybrid approach, as well as for specific hybrid methods (interval analysis/probability, 
possibility/probability, etc.).  
 
 
6. SEMI-QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES 
 
The representations described so far are all quantitative. Another approach, which may be 
referred to as semi-quantitative, is based on a mixture of quantitative representations and 
qualitative methods. It may hence be considered a type of hybrid approach, integrating 
quantitative and qualitative representations. Examples of implementations include the approaches 
described by Aven [74,75,76] and Flage & Aven [77], where in both cases standard probabilistic 
risk descriptions are supplemented by a qualitative assessment of uncertainty aspects not properly 
reflected by the quantitative descriptions. 
 
A semi-quantitative approach implies, as the hybrid approach, a belief that probability is not 
perfect, but in addition it requires a belief that the full scope of uncertainty and risk cannot be 
transformed into a quantitative format, using probability or any other measure of uncertainty. 
Following this approach, when taken as a supplement to a precise probabilistic analysis, so-called 
“uncertainty factors” that are “hidden” in the background knowledge (see Mosleh and Bier [78] 
regarding elements in the background knowledge that can be uncertain and considered unknown 




Using some simple procedures, the strength of the knowledge that supports the probabilistic 
analysis is categorized. For example a judgment is made on the knowledge being weak if one or 
more of these conditions are true [77]:  
 
- The assumptions made represent strong simplifications. 
- Data are not available, or are unreliable. 
- There is lack of agreement/consensus among experts. 
- The phenomena involved are not well understood; models are non-existent or 
known/believed to give poor predictions.  
 
If, on the other hand, all of the following conditions are met, the knowledge is considered strong: 
 
- The assumptions made are seen as very reasonable.  
- Much reliable data are available.  
- There is broad agreement/consensus among experts.  
- The phenomena involved are well understood; the models used are known to give 
predictions with the required accuracy.  
 
Cases in between are classified as having medium strength of knowledge. In addition there needs 
to be a sensitivity analysis of the importance of the uncertainty factor. If an unreasonable 
assumption is made but the overall result of the risk analysis is not very sensitive to deviations 
from this assumption, then the assumption is not as critical as if a small deviation leads to 




More detailed schemes can be developed on the basis of judgments of the criticality of the 
assumptions made [76,77]. An assumption is critical the strength of knowledge supporting it is 
weak and at the same time deviations from it significantly increases the risk level as assessed in 
the risk analysis. The idea is to perform a crude risk assessment of potential deviations from the 
conditions/states defined by the assumptions. For example, if an assumption is made in a process 
plant risk analysis saying that a gas leak will be ignited immediately, then we may perform an 
assumption deviation risk assessment to consider the likelihood and effect of a delayed ignition. 
Let X denote the number of fatalities and suppose that the risk index of interest is the expected 
number of fatalities, EX. The base case assessment was that the time to ignition T would be zero, 
i.e. E[X|T=0], but we also consider say T equal to 30 seconds, i.e. E[X|T=30]. The aim of the 
assessment is to assign a risk score for each deviation, which reflects risk related to the 
magnitude of the deviation and its implications. This “assumption deviation risk” score provides 
a measure of criticality or importance of the assumption. Depending on an overall judgment of 
these assumptions scores, a total strength of knowledge level is determined.     
 
This criticality (importance) scoring of assumptions can be used as a guideline for where to place 
the focus to improve the risk assessment. The assumptions with the high criticality score should 
be examined to see if they can be dealt with in some way and removed from the highest 
importance category (for example, using the law of total probability).  There will, however, 
always be some factors which a probability or other risk metrics cannot be made unconditional 





7. OVERALL DISCUSSION 
 
We have ventured beyond probability to describe uncertainties in a risk assessment context. For 
that, we have considered alternative approaches for representing uncertainty that have been 
looked into, including those based on interval probability, possibility theory and evidence theory. 
We have made the point, strongly, that extending the framework for uncertainty analysis 
naturally leads to the extension of the framework for risk assessment and management. In much 
of the existing literature on the representation and analysis of uncertainty, risk is defined in 
relation to probability. For example using the well-known triplet definition of risk by Kaplan and 
Garrick [57], risk is equal to the triplet (si, pi, ci), where si is the i'th scenario, pi is the probability 
of that scenario, and ci the consequence of the i’th scenario, i =1,2, …N. In this view, risk 
captures: What can happen? How likely is that to happen? If it does happen, what are the 
consequences?  
 
Kaplan [79] has generalised the above risk definition by defining risk as equal to the triplet 
(si, li, ci), where si and ci are defined as above, and li denotes the likelihood of si. However, only 
probabilistic formats are described for the likelihood component, namely frequency, (subjective) 
probability and probability of frequency. The latter refers to the use of subjective probability to 
express uncertainty about uncertain frequencies/frequentist probabilities. 
 
Such a perspective is too narrow to accommodate the integration of different approaches for 
representing and characterising uncertainty and risk: a broader perspective is required to allow 





If risk is defined through probabilities as in the Kaplan and Garrick [57] and Kaplan [79] settings, 
we need to clarify what probability means. It cannot obviously be a subjective definition, as we 
seek a general framework that extends beyond such type of probabilities.  Hence, probability 
must refer to a frequentist concept. However, frequentist probabilities cannot be justified in cases 
of non-repeatability and therefore cannot serve as a general concept for risk assessment, 
applicable to all types of uncertainty representations. We, consequently, have to leave the 
probability-based risk concepts, and extend to perspectives on risk that are based on uncertainty 
instead of probability. 
 
One of the most general risk perspectives is the so-called (C,U) risk perspective, where risk is 
understood as the two-dimensional combination of the (severity of the) consequences C of an 
activity and associated uncertainties  U (what will C be?) [80,81].  This perspective is closely 
linked to some common risk perspectives in social sciences [82,83,84], which express that risk is 
basically the same as consequences C or events that could lead to C. The definitions of risk are 
different, but when it comes to the way risk is to be described there are strong similarities as the 
C-type perspective also covers consequences and uncertainties.  
 
The knowledge dimension enters the scene when we try to describe or measure risk. A risk 
description is obtained by specifying the consequences C and using a description (measure) of 
uncertainty Q (which could be probability or any other measure – measure is here interpreted in a 
wide sense). Specifying the events/consequences means to identify a set of events/quantities of 
interest C’ that characterise the events/consequences C. An example of C’ is the number of 
fatalities. Depending on the principles laid down for specifying C and on the choice of Q, we 
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obtain different perspectives on how to describe/measure risk. As a general description of risk, 
we can write (C’,Q, K), where K is the knowledge that the specification of C’ and the assignment 
Q is based on. Hence, following this definition, there is a sharp distinction between the risk 
concept per se, and how risk is measured or described.  
 
Instead of (C,U), we often write (A,C,U), when we would like to focus on 
hazards/threats/opportunities A. Similarly we write (A’,C’,Q, K) in place of (C’,Q,K). 
Vulnerability given A, can then be defined as (C,U|A), and a vulnerability description covers 
(C’,Q,K|A); i.e., vulnerability given an event A is basically risk conditional on this event.     
 
We see that such a way of understanding and describing risk allows for all type of uncertainty 
representations, and it could consequently serve as a basis for a unified perspective for treating 




In the present paper, we have highlighted foundational issues for the representation of uncertainty 
in risk assessment as well as discussed the practical implications, concerns and challenges. We 
have looked into five principal directions: 
 
i) Subjective probability 
ii) Non-probabilistic representations with the interpretation as lower and upper probabilities 
iii) Non-probabilistic representations with interpretations other than lower and upper 
probabilities (degree of belief, degree of possibility etc.) 
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iv) Hybrid combinations of probabilistic and non-probabilistic representations 
v) Semi-quantitative approaches 
 
These directions are not mutually exclusive, as for example (iv) could be based on a combination 
of (i) and (ii), and (v) could be seen as a special case of (iv), since it is based on the combination 
a quantitative approach (i.e. (i), (ii) or (iii)) and some qualitative assessments. 
 
Subjective probability is currently the most common approach for treating also epistemic 
uncertainty in risk analysis. We have reflected on the position that “probability is perfect”, on one 
side, and on the need for an extended framework for risk assessment that reflects the separation 
that practically exists between analyst and decision maker, on the other side. 
 
We have argued that we need to see beyond probability to adequately reflect uncertainties in a 
risk assessment context. However, we have highlighted that how this should be done is not 
straightforward. A handful of approaches are out there, but they are of not easily implemented in 
practice. More research has to be carried out to bring these alternative approaches to an operative 
state where they can in fact be used in practice, when needed. The development in this direction 
should have the clear aim of obtaining a unified perspective (covering concepts, principles, 
theories and operative approaches) for the representation and characterisation of risk and 
uncertainty, by linking probability and alternative representations of uncertainty. 
 
Furthermore, we support that a framework for risk assessment needs to allow for both qualitative 
and quantitative approaches. Earlier research has to a large extent been quantitative, but we have 
underlined that the full scope of the risks and uncertainties cannot be transformed into a 
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mathematical formula, using probabilities or other quantitative measures of uncertainty. Numbers 
can be generated, but these alone would not serve the purpose of the risk assessment: to reveal 
and describe the risks and uncertainties. Qualitative approaches linked to probability exist (see 
Section 6), but similar approaches have not been developed for the alternative quantitative 
approaches (probability-bound analysis, imprecise probabilities, possibility theory, evidence 
theory). 
 
Finally, earlier attempts at integration (hybrid probability and possibility approaches) have been 
based on the idea that there exists one and only one appropriate representation in a specific case 
(e.g. possibility representation if the information is poor and subjective probabilities if the 
information is strong). We believe that the variety of decision-making situations calls for a 
unified perspective that allows the use of several approaches for representing and characterising 
the risk and uncertainties. To inform the decision maker, both subjective probabilities and 
imprecision intervals may be used, as these approaches could capture different types of 
information and knowledge important for the decision maker. In addition qualitative approaches 
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